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LABOR LAW AND ASSUMPTION OF RISK
HENRY WEISSt

I

BEYOND

the scope of the Workmen's Compensation Law, a field of
employer-employee litigation has continued to grow in somewhat
spasmodic fashion. An increasing awareness of the remedies available
under the Labor Laws and Rules of the Industrial Board has stimulated
this peripheral phase of tort liability. In recent years some of the industrial diseases have expanded into this fringe area. Particularly, the
silicosis action accounted for much of the litigation. It is not a matter
of certainty that various amendments to the Compensation Law, presumably encompassing the dust diseases will in fact accomplish that
result.' Nor can it as yet be said that all diseases acquired as a result of
work done are compensatable. 2
Where the cause of action is based upon the employer's violation of
the Labor Law or Rules of the Industrial Board, is it a valid defense to
assert that the employee assumed the risk of such violation?
t Member of the New York Bar.
1. N. Y. WoRxm-N's COMPENSATioN LAW § 3, subd. 2, par. 28 was enacted in 1935
and then, in effect, was superseded as to dust diseases by N. Y. WoRKIMN's ComPENSATIoN
LAW, Art. 4a, § 67. (N. Y. Laws 1936,. c. 887, effective June 6, 1936) which provides
compensation for injurious exposure subsequent to Sept. 1, 1935. Mutolo v. Utica General
Jobbing Foundry, 161 Misc. 327, 292 N. Y. Supp. 14 (1936). It provides only for total
temporary or permanent disability. Although this article is made an exclusive remedy for
all dust ailments, it has been held that complete absence of remedy of any kind for partial
disability does not render the article unconstitutional. del Busto v. E. I. Dupont de Nemours
& Co., Inc., 167 Misc. 920, 5 N. Y. S. (2d) 174 (1938). But see, Powers v. Porcelain
Insulator Corp., 285 N. Y. 54, 32 N. E. (2d) 790 (1941), and Scherini v. Titanium Alloy
Co., 286 N. Y. 531, 37 N. E. (2d) 237 (1941). This article was amended by N. Y. Laws
1940, c. 548 (N. Y. WoRKmN''s CoMENSATiON LAW, § 66). Dealing as it does with a
difficult subject, the draftsman seems to have mounted his horse and galloped off in all
directions. The compensation benefits are ultimately increased. As to actions where
exposure occurred both before and after Sept. 1, 1935 a short statute of 90 days from
April 16, 1940 seems to have been enacted.
2. N. Y. WoRxMEN's COMPENSATION LAW, § 3, subd. 2, par. 28, apparently enacted
as a reservoir for industrial diseases, does in reality take care of the greatest number of
unspecified occupationaldiseases. But that very last term has been the subject of conflicting
judicial construction. Compare Bishop v. Comer and Pollock Inc., 251 App. Div. 492, 297
N. Y. Supp. 946 (3d Dep't 1937) with Goldberg v. 954 Marcy Corporation, 276 N. Y. 313,
12 N. E. (2d) 311 (1938) and Lerner v. Rump Brothers, 241 N. Y. 153, 149 N. E. 334
(1925). Both the Goldberg case and Lurye v. Stem Bros. Department Store, 275 N. Y.
182, 9 N. E. (2d) 828 (1937) are cited in Nayor v. Harwick Trucking Corporation, 283
N. Y. 62, 27 N. E. (2d) 434 (1940) and the matter is left in doubt. But see, Daniels v
Udell Sons & Co., 261 App. Div. 855, 24 N.'Y. S. (2d) 747 (3d Dep't 1941), appeal dis-
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Litigated for over fifty years, this question has been in the last few
years variously decided by our Courts. The Appellate Division of the
3
Fourth Department in Fiore et al. v. General Railway Signal Company
affirmed an order denying a motion to strike out the defense of assumption of risk pleaded to a cause of action based upon violation of the
Labor Law. This was decided with the brief notation, ". . . as to assumption of risk, see Gombert v. McKay, 201 N. Y. 27 and Fitzwater v.
Warren, 206 N. Y. 355." Shortly after the Fiore case, the identical
question arose in the Third Department. Justice Schenck, at Special
Term, granted a motion to strike out this defense in Griebsch v. B. T.
Babbitt, Inc.,4 saying:
"The plaintiff contends that, as the second cause of action is based on violation of the Labor Law, this defense is untenable as a matter of law because
the Labor Law imposes absolute duties upon employers from which they cannot
escape merely by showing that the employee submitted to these risks and
voluntarily assumed them. This court is fully in accord with this contention.
The purposes and spirit of labor legislation is to protect the employee. If the
employer were allowed to shift the responsibility to the employee, this purpose
would be defeated. The entire trend of precedent upon this point clearly indicates that it is the law of this State that an employee does not assume any
risks by working in a place and under conditions which he knows to be unsafe
and in violation of the Labor Laws. The duty on the employer is absolute."5
The resolution of this conflict takes us back over the stream of judicial
meandering for a period of many years. A very interesting course it is,
full of ox-bows but not without clear deep running water. Two views
were developed by the courts up to the advent of Fitzwater v. Warren6
and Welch v. Waterbury,7 both decided by the Court of Appeals in the
order named, in 1912. The first of these represented, up to 1912, the
majority and prevailing view. The second was a minority position, which,
however, forecast the rule in labor decisions subsequently to be adopted.
Basic to the earlier prevailing position were two premises. The first was
missed mein., 286 N. Y. 17 (1941); Moore v. Colonial Sand & Stone Co., 261 App. Div. 857,
24 N. Y. S. (2d) 751 (3d Dep't 1941); Bak v. Kotok Fish Distributor, 261 App. Div. 862,
24 N. Y. S. (2d) 752 (3d Dep't 1941).
3. 249 App. Div. 708, 292 N. Y. Supp. 704, leave to appeal denied, 249 App. Div. 797,
293 N. Y. Supp. 495 (4th Dep't 1936). The same Court followed this case in Laviera v.
The Pfaudler Company, 249 App. Div. 924, 293 N. Y. Supp. 503 (4th Dep't 1937).
4. 164 Misc. 7, 298 N. Y. Supp. 848 (1937).
5. Id. at 9, 298 N. Y. Supp. at 850, aff'd, 254 App. Div. 601, 2 N. Y. S. (2d) 848, leave
to appeal denied, 254 App. Div. 785, 4 N. Y. S. (2d) 1018 (3d Dep't 1938).
6. 206 N. Y. 355, 99 N. E. 1042 (1912).
7. 206 N. Y. 522, 100 N. E. 426 (1912).
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that no distinction obtained, as to the character of a master's obligations
and their enforcement at common law and under labor statutes. In one
of the earliest cases asserting this premise, Freeman v. Glens Falls Paper
Mill Co.,8 plaintiff's intestate was killed as a result of defendant's failure
to provide automatic elevator doors as required by the labor statute.
The intestate, working as defendant's employee, knew of this condition.
The trial court charged that the statute requiring automatic doors had
no bearing on the case because the intestate indisputably had knowledge
of the violation and thus accepted the situation. On appeal from a
judgment for the defendant, the Appellate Division of the Third Department in affirming stated in part:
"The duty prescribed by this statute is not more or greater than the commonlaw duty of an employer to his employees to provide a safe place in which,
and proper machinery with which, to work. And the defendant's liability to
the person injured by reason of the statute not being complied with, is not
an absolute one, but is subject to the same limitations and restrictions as is the
common-law liability for not furnishing a safe place and proper machinery. ' 9
The courts held that the employee waived performance by the employer
of his statutory obligations and voluntarily assumed the risks of such
non-performance; therefore the benefits under the statute were not available to the plaintiff employee.
The second premise, which is an obvious corollary to the first, was that
violation of a labor statute did not give rise to a new and independent
cause of action. This was propounded when shortly thereafter, in 1896,
the same question was presented to the Court of Appeals in Knisley v.
Pratt.10 Though in the Freeman case the action was not brought solely
upon statutory violation, non-compliance with the labor statute was an
integral part of the complaint. The complaint in the Knisley case contained no allegation of violation of the statute; common law breach of
the master's duty to the servant was relied upon. Nevertheless, the case
was decided in the Court of Appeals (by reason of its later injection into
the record) as involving violation of provisions of the Factory Act regulating the employment of women and the guarding of machinery. The
defendant asserted assumption of risk. The Court preceded its holding
8. 70 Hun 530, 24 N. Y. Supp. 403 (3d Dep't 1893), aff'd ment. 142 N. Y. 639, 37 N. E.
567 (1894).
9. Id. at 534, 24 N. Y. Supp. at 405-406.
10. 148 N. Y. 372, 42 N. E. 986 (1896). On the nature of the "duty" following the
rule of the Freeman and Knisley cases, see Rabe v. Consolidated Ice Co., 113 Fed. 905
(C. C. A. 2d 1902).
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by certain propositions which it considered primary, that the Factory
Act did not create a new cause of action, but that an action thereunder
was simply one at common law based upon negligence. The Court held
that although protection of a particular class was contemplated by the
Act, statutory safeguards of this kind did not deprive employees "of
their free agency and the right to manage their own affairs". Measured
against such apparent "freedom to deal" the judgment was reversed for
the ultimate reason that nothing contained in the Factory Act prevented
an employee's "contractual" assumption of the risk of the breach of that
labor statute.
A great many cases within the following few years were decided in
accord with the rule of the Freeman and Knisley cases. 1 After the
decision of Butler v. Townsend et al. 2 asserting non-liability of an employer for injuries to his servant owing to the collapse of a scaffold, the
legislature took note. By the laws of 1897, c. 415, § 18, a provision of
the Labor Law was added which in effect affirmatively enjoined an
employer from providing an unsafe scaffold. The courts countered with
a compromise. Under this section, following the Knisley case, McLaughlin v. Eidlitz3 held that knowledge on the part of the employee of Labor
Law violations with respect to a scaffold presented a question of fact for
a jury's determination as to whether the employee assumed the risk of
such violation. It would seem that even with aid of the mandatory
language of the legislative act14 this change was too much for the judicial
digestion. And so, evading a forthright position, the meaty part of the
act was disgorged for a jury's more lusty appetite. Notwithstanding the
evasiveness of the rule thus formulated it represented a very concrete
gain for the employee. Though the knowledge of the employee was in
11. Shields v. Robins, 3 App. Div. 582, 38 N. Y. Supp. 214 (1st Dep't 1896) involving
violation of a statute as to covering elevators; plaintiff, knowing thereof, was held to have
assumed the risk on the basis of the Knisley and Freeman cases. This is typical of the
many cases to be found in the reports. In Hayes v. Fay, 22 Misc. 320, 49 N. Y. Supp. 112
(1898) it was held that the plaintiff might assume the risk and that such question was for
the jury where suit was based on violation of labor statute as to guarding an excavation,
applying the principle of the Knisley case.
12. 126 N. Y. 105, 26 N. E. 1017 (1891).
13. So App. Div. 518, 64 N. Y. Supp. 193 (2d Dep't 1900).
14. The relevant language of (N. Y. Laws) 1897, c. 415, § 18 is: "A person employing
or directing another to perform labor of any kind in the erection, repairing, altering or
painting of a house, building or structure shall not furnish or erect, or cause to be furnished
or erected for the performance of such labor, scaffolding, hoists, stays, ladders, or other
mechanical contrivances which are unsafe, unsuitable or improper and which are not so
constructed, placed and operated as to give proper protection to the life and limb of a
person so employed or engaged." (writer's italics).
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most cases easily proved by the defendant employer, the compromise
rule afforded an opportunity to enlist the jury's sympathy in arriving at
a result in disregard of the facts.
However, if the McLaughlin case attempted to compromise by the
aid of the jury between an old rule by precedent and a new one by legislative act, the Court of Appeals in Gombert v. McKay 8 would have
neither the new rule nor the compromise. It is to be noted that this case
was one of the two relied upon by the Court in the comparatively recent
Fiore case, supra. ,Plaintiff's intestate was employed by the defendant
to build the exterior of a structure, and participated in the erection of
a scaffold used for that work. Collapse of this scaffold resulted in the
death of the employee, Plaintiff relied upon section 18 of the Labor Law
previously referred to in the McLaughlin case. On appeal from a judgment for the defendant, entered on a directed verdict, the Court of
Appeals affirmed, relying specifically upon the ratio decidendi of the
Freeman and Knisley cases. Certainly at this point the settled rule was
established beyond question. Strong statutory language had failed to
upset or temper it. 16
II
Little was left of an employee's civil remedy under the labor statutes
in light of the unanimous action of the Court of Appeals in Gombert v.
McKay. 7 Nevertheless, even as the rule was being firmly entrenched
there arose a contemporaneous current of legal thought which, though
representing in most cases a dissident position, very soon effectively
undermined the holding in the Gombert case. This undercurrent of contrary opinion, remaining obscurely in the background, flowed from factual
and legal premises quite different from those epitomized in the Gombert
case. It had been by this time well established that a release or exonerating agreement given by an employee to his employer in advance of
accident and injury to cover the employer's violations of common law
obligations was invalid as against the public policy of the state.'8 This
15. 201.N. Y. 27, 94 N. E. 186 (1911).
16. Characteristic of judicial process is the foreshadowed "disintegration" of the rule;
this is variously manifested in its application. In the McLaughlin case the question is sent
to the jury for determination as one of fact. In the Gombert case the determination was
reserved for the Trial judge as one of law. Thus while both make nominal adherence
to the same basic principle, the actual variance in application is crucial.
17. 201 N. Y. 27, 94 N. E. 186 (1911).
18. In Purdy v. R. W. & 0. R. R. Co., 125 N. Y. 209, 26 N. E. 255 (1891), the exonerating agreement given after the inception of employment was held inoperative for lack
of consideration, with indication that even with consideration present its validity was
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holding was shortly to be applied with considerable force to the instant
problem. Specifically as to statutory duties of the master, an entirely
different position on the problem of assumption of risk had been taken
as early as 1894 by the General Term in Simpson v. New York Rubber
Co.Y Here, on appeal from a judgment for the servant in an action based
on a statute requiring guarding of machinery, wherein the Trial Court
denied a request to charge that if plaintiff was found to have known of
the failure to guard he assumed the obvious
risks incident to such failure
20
to guard, the judgment was affirmed.
Reaction from the majority view that the risk of violation might be
assumed is strongly championed in the dissent in Bushtis v. Catskill
Cement Co.,21 where an appeal was taken from dismissal of the plaintiff's
complaint in an action for injuries while in the defendant's employ. The
action was based in part on violation of the Factory Act, so-called. On
the authority of the Knisley case, it was held that the plaintiff assumed
the risk. Judge Kellogg, in his thorough and illuminating dissent, urges
subject to question. In Johnston v. Fargo, 184 N. Y. 379, 77 N. E. 388 (1906) the agreement was executed as a condition of employment at its inception; nevertheless the agreement was held invalid because its effect was to vitiate those rules of common law and
statute designed to protect the employee and thereby destroy the employer's incentive to
observe them.
19. 80 Hun 415, 30 N. Y. Supp. 339 (2d Dep't 1894), decided by three justices who
concurred in result only. One of the justices arrived at a similar result but declined at
that time to follow the reasoning of the first opinion as to a waiver by an employee of
statutory protection.
20. Cullen, J., writing well in advance of current legal thought, realistically remarked,
id. at 417, 30 N. Y. Supp. at 340: "Experience has shown that in some matters persons
must be protected from their own imprudence. If there were to be considered only the
interest of the individual in his personal security the statute would be unnecessary. The
end sought to be accomplished could equally well be secured by contract between the
employer and the employee. The matter has always been a subject of contract, that is,
no law has ever forbidden employee's making the guarding of machinery a condition of
their service. Yet such contracts are unknown. If, therefore, assent can dispense with the
statutory protection, the subject, for practical purposes, is left in the same condition as
it was before the enactment of the statute."
It is notable that in his well considered opinion, Judge Cullen distinguished Freeman v.
Glens Falls Paper Mill Co., 70 Hun 530, 24 N. Y. Supp. 403 (3d Dep't 1893), on the ground
that in the latter case the action sounded in negligence and so the question here presented
was "not necessarily involved". It is, however, difficult to follow judge Cullen when he
cites White v. Lithographic Co., 131 N. Y. 631, 30 N. E. 236 (1892) as an expression by
the Court of Appeals in support of his position. The opinion of Cullen, J., places reliance
upon the inferences which flow from Purdy v. Railroad Co., 125 N. Y. 209, 26 N. E. 255
(1891), supra, note 18.
21. 128 App. Div. 780, 113 N. Y. Supp. 294 (3d Dep't 1908), aff'd mem., 198 N. Y. 548
(1910).
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a reconsideration of the rule of the majority, particularly in the light of

the changing attitude of the Legislature with respect to the protection
of labor. 22 Although the dissent in the Bushtis case was not adopted
by the Court of Appeals, almost at the same time it was recognized by
the Appellate Division of the Fourth Department in Grave, v. Gustave
Stickley Co.' that a change in policy was desirable, with the result that
the Court regarded as open the question of the availability of the defense
of assumption of risk. The appellate court took the position that since
the Knisley case, and those cases decided on that authority, "the statutory law of oir state for protecting the lives and health of employees
engaged in hazardous employments, including workers in factories, has
undergone a marked change for better safeguarding them from harm."24
By this time the rule of the Knisley case and later Gombert case was

made the subject of searching attack in a collateral fashion in the Federal
courts and by some of the law commentators. In 1899 Taft, J., writing
for the Circuit Court of Appeals of the Sixth Circuit in Narramore v.
Cleveland, C., C. & St. L. Ry. Co. considered the Knisley case and held

to the contrary.25 The plaintiff had caught his foot in a switch block.
An Ohio statute required the defendant to use switches which would have
22. The dissenting opinion of Judge Kellogg is of value in following the course of
litigation as well as for its analysis of the beneficial effects intended under the labor statutes
as they were at the close of the last century. it is notable also for its judicial recognition
of a public policy implicit, at least, in such statutes, recognition curiously absent in much
of the judicial reasoning on this subject.
23. 125 App. Div. 132, 109 N. . Supp. 256 (4th Dep't 1908), aff'd mem., 195 N. Y. 584,
89 N. E. 1101 (1909).
24. Id. at 136, 109 N. Y. Supp. at 259, 260. There were in fact many such statutory
changes. In some instances the language and provisions were considerably strengthened.
For example compare as to scaffolding N. Y. Laws 1885 c. 314 with N. Y. Laws 1891 c.214.
And with these, compare N. Y. Laws 1897 c. 415 and N. Y. Laws 1899 c. 192. In most
instances, however, the changes were extensions merely of degree. There were relatively
few changes of such tenor as could satisfactorily reconcile the Knisley case with the Simpson
case, The Court in the Graves case simply recognized the existence of a legislative policy
which the vast body of cases contemporaneously decided completely overlooked or deliberately disregarded.
25. 96 Fed. 298 (C. C. A. 6th 1899). The concept of statutory protection of a "specific
class" rather than a general statute, it- will be seen, comes to be regarded as basic to the
existence of a cause of action founded solely upon such statute. Terminal recognition of
such evolution of the "statutory cause of action" is well demonstrated in Schmidt v.
Merchants Despatch Transportation Co., 270 N. Y. 287, 200 N. E. 824 (1936), note 58, infra.
In accord with the Narranore case is Welsh v. Barber Asphalt Paving Co., 167 Fed. 465
(C. C. A. 9th 1909), arising upon a similar Oregon statute. But see contra, Denver &
R. G. R. Co. v. Norgate, 141 Fed. 247 (C. C. A. 8th 1905); St. Louis Cordage Co. v. Miller,
126 Fed. 495, 509 (C. C. A. 8th 1903) on comparable statutes.
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prevented such an occurrence. The Court recognized that while under
common law the plaintiff would have assumed the risk since he knew
of the condition, the question was presented whether the statute changed
the rule of liability so as to relieve the plaintiff of the effect of assumption
of risk. In holding that the effect of the statute was to eliminate this
defense, it was pointed out that the authorities followed by the Court of
Appeals in the Knisley case did not involve a statute "enjoining a specific
duty of a master for the protection of servants",26 and confused the
doctrine of assumption of risk with the rule of contributory negligence.
Francis Bohlen writing some seven years later2" upheld Taft's criticism
of the Knisley case. There is pointed out the distinction of the application of the assumption of risk and contributory negligence defenses
in the fact of statutory violations. At or about the same ,time similar
28
conclusions were reached upon review of the rule by W. E. Freerks,
G. W. Payne,29 and in part by R. D. Thurber. 30 Something of a stalemate in reasoning was reached, however, because of too great an emphasis
on the distinction obtaining between assumption of risk and contributory
negligence. The former was regarded exclusively as a contractual matter,
the latter a rule of conduct. 1 Passing the correctness of the legalistics
of the argument, the consequent rule of non-availability of assumption
of risk is a non-sequitur. It was in any event unnecessary to the position
whih rested upon a much more certain foundation of common sense and
legislative policy. Payne did point out one of the absurdities of a contrary rule: "....

the more dangerous the place and the more obvious the

32
danger, the more certain will the master be that he will escape liability."
26. Id. at 303.
27. Bohlen, Voluntary Assumption of Risk (1906) 20 HARv. L. Rav. 14, 91. Bohlen
remarks at page 113: ". . . as Taft, J., points out, a servant may be debarred from recovering for injury received from the breach of a statutory duty on his master's part by his
own contributory negligence. A servant who continues to work, knowing that a statutory
protection has been omitted, while he does not waive the liability for the violation of the
statute, is bound to use care commensurate with the added risk to avoid the injurious
consequences of such a breach of the statute."
28. Freerks, Doctrine of Assumed Risk (1905) 61 CENT. L. J. 446.
29. Payne, Effect of Legislation Requiring the Master to Guard Dangerous Machinery
(1908) 66 CENT. L. J. 157; Payne, Servants Assumption of Risk of Masters' Breach of
Statutory Duty (1910) 71 CENT. L. J. 131.

30. Thurber, The Labor Law as a Basis for Suit (1909) 16 BFxcr & BAR 56, 93.
31. Freerks, op. cit. supra, note 28, relies particularly on this.
32. Payne, loc. cit. supra, note 29, 71 CENT. L. J. at 133.
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III
The Gombert case,3 3 a firm declaration of an extreme position, was
decided in February, 1911. The restiveness of some lower courts, a few
Federal tribunals and several writers was, we have seen, definitely manifest even before this latest affirmation of an established rule. However,
the Court of Appeals was itself in a surprisingly short interval apparently convinced that the Gombert rule was untenable. The following
year, the Court without any change in membership reversed its position,
not, however, without dissent, in Fitzwater v. Warren. 4
In the Fitzwater case, in answer to a conceded violation of the labor
statute requiring the guarding of machinery, the defendant pleaded the
plaintiff's assumption of risk. On appeal from dismissal of the complaint,
the Appellate Division reversed the judgment. The matter came to the
Court of Appeals, therefore, on stipulation by the defendant -for judgment
absolute. That Court stated, first, that public policy precluded an
employee from assuming a risk created by a violation of statute, citing
the Simpson 5 case for this principle. The Court found the Knisley case
was "largely qualified, if not virtually overruled, by the subsequent
decision of this Court in Johnston v. Fargo (184 N. Y. 379).1136 What
could not be done by express agreement, it was reasoned, to relieve the
master of obligation to his employee might not be accomplished by
implication in defiance of the employer's statutory duties. In any event,
said the ,Court, a dismissal of the complaint was improper because a fair
question had been presented for the jury as to assumption of risk. Contradictory to and weakening the prior part of the decision, this latter
comment is of particular significance. The Court rendered judgment for
the plaintiff by virtue of the stipulation for judgment absolute. Two of
the judges dissented on the theory that assumption of risk had been
established as a matter of law. In light of what had so recently before
been said, the Fitzwater case was surprisingly unequivocal. If the Gombert case was not technically in contradiction, it was indubitably repudiated in principle. Whatever uncertainty existed as to the meaning of
the Fitzwater case was soon dissipated by interpretation and application.
The conflict in decisions was readily recognized in Grady v. National
Conduit & Cable Co. ' The plaintiff therein relied upon Section 18 of
33.

Gombert v. McKay, 201 N. Y. 27, 94 N. E. 186 (1911).

34.
35.

206 N. Y. 355, 99 N. E. 1042 (1912).
Simpson v. N. Y. Rubber Co., 80 Hun 415, 30 N. Y. Supp. 339 (2d Dep't 1894).

36.

Fitzwater v. Warren, 206 N. Y. 355, 358, 99 N. E. 1042 (1912).

37.

153 App. Div. 401, 138 N. Y. Supp. 549 (2d Dep't 1912).
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the Labor Law which related to unsafe scaffolding. The court charged
that the plaintiff assumed the risk, the danger being open and obvious.
Considering the conflict between the Knisley, Gombert and Fitzwater
cases, the Appellate Division elected to follow the last named case and
held that even in face of the employee's knowledge of statutory violations,
the employer might not assert the defense of assumption of risk. The
Court of Appeals, in the same year which gave rise to the Fitzwater case
and the Grady case in the lower Court, made even clearer its newly taken
position in Welch v. Waterbury.' This much litigated case made its first
reported appearance in the Appellate Division3 prior to the Gombert case
and the Fitzwater case. It involved the failure to guard machinery in
accordance with the Labor Law, and had resulted in a judgment for the
plaintiff which was reversed by the Appellate Court and a new trial
granted by reason of the fact that the case was tried entirely on a common
law theory, that is, as an action based on the master's negligence. On
such theory the Court held there was a question of plaintiff's assumption
of risk which should have been presented to the jury. The case appeared
again the following year in the same Court" on appeal from a dismissal
of the complaint on the several grounds that there was insufficiency of
notice to bring the case under the Employer's Liability Act and that,
regarded as a common law action, the plaintiff must fail because of
assumption of risk. The Appellate Division affirmed the dismissal. The
Court of Appeals in 1912, the year of the Fitzwater case, reversed the
judgment and granted a new trial; in so doing the Court stated: "The
risks occasioned by the failure of the employer to supply statutory safeguards were not, as a matter of law, assumed by the employee, though
he had full knowledge of such failure." 41 As though this were not enough,
in the concurring opinion it is added that regarded as an action under
common law the Court was nevertheless controlled by the Fitzwater case.
To what extent this latter position might be relied upon is doubtful so
far as the abrogation of the defense to a common law action "involving"
violation of a labor statute is concerned but apparently the statute was
thought to cut off this defense as a matter of law upon motion to dismiss
an action in negligence. It is curious that no mention is made of the
exactly opposite holding in the Gombert case, decided just a year before.
The application of this newly interpreted rule is shortly found in fur38.
39.
40.
41.

206 N. Y. 522, 100
Welch v. Waterbury
144 App. Div. 213,
206 N. Y. 522, 526,

N. E. 426 (1912).
& Co., 136 App. Div. 315, 120 N. Y. Supp. 1059 (2d Dep't 1910).
128 N. Y. Supp. 974 (2d Dep't 1911).
100 N. E. 426 (1912).

1942]

LABOR LAW AND ASSUMPTION OF RISK

ther litigation of the Welch case. In 1913 appeal was taken to the Appellate Division from a judgment for the plaintiff.4" The defendant had
requested the Court to charge that, if the plaintiff knew that the cog

wheels were unguarded, the jury "might find that the plaintiff had voluntarily 'assumed the risk' ". This charge was refused on the authority of
the Fitzwater and Grady cases. 3 The change in the rule now seemingly
well established was, however, not accepted without question. In New

York, N. H. & H. R. Co. v. Vizvari,"I the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals, referring to a distinction between the duty of a master under
common law and by statute, regarded such concept as "fanciful and
contrary to common sense"; nor did it find support for such position in

the New York cases. Nevertheless the transitional state of the rule was
recognized in various decisions of the 1912-1914 period.4 5 The more
extreme viewpoint (following the concurring opinion in the Welch case)
is found in several cases which purport to eliminate the defense of
assumption of risk even though the action is not founded upon violation
of the Labor Law. This projection of the Fitzwater-Welck rule to the
common law cause of action is clearly a position without justification
in reason or precedent. The cases which so project the Fitzwater-Welch
rule seem to rely largely upon the holding of Johnston v. Fargo. The
Johnston case related to an agreement which, while touching upon the
common law duties, nevertheless was executed in advance of the actual
42. 159 App. Div. 509, 144 N. Y. Supp. 688 (2d Dep't 1913).
43. Id., at 510. It was not in dispute that the plaintiff had been employed in the
defendant's factory for a considerable period of time and certainly knew of the failure to
comply with the statutory requirements. Two judges of the Appellate Division dissented,
significantly enough, insofar as the majority opinion held that assumption of risk is wiped
out by public policy in a common law action. The majority view was subsequently
affirmed in the Court of Appeals without opinion in Welch v. Waterbury Co., 217 N. Y.
604, 111 N. E. 1096 (1916). Compare with this the concurring opinion in the Court of
Appeals decision in Welch v. Waterbury, 206 N. Y. 522, 524, 100 N. E. 426 (1912).
44. 210 Fed. 118 (C. C. A. 2d, 1913); this case arose ufider the Federal Employer's
Liability Act.
45. Bakewell v. Orford Copper Co., 160 App. Div. 671, 145 N. Y. Supp. 1070 (2d Dep't
1914) is of particular interest, bearing in mind that the Welch case was in constant litigation
until 1916; after consideration of the Fitzwater and Welch cases there is noted "the transitional state through which New York Law is passing." See also, Leddy v. Carley, 78 Misc.
546, 139 N. Y. Supp. 227 (1912).
46. Felcin v. Society of The New York Hospital, 155 App. Div. 545, 140 N. Y. Supp. 772
(1st Dep't 1913); Rosasco v. Ideal Opening Die Co., 79 Misc. 507, 141 N. Y. Supp. 23
(1913). Both apparently propose a rule of legal insufficiency of the defense both at common law and under the statute. See also Wasilewski v. Warner Sugar Refining Co., 87
Misc. 156, 149 N. Y. Supp. 1035 (1914).
47. 184 N. Y. 379, 77 N. E. 388 (1906).
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assumption of risk or the possibility thereof and included risks of all
kinds whether eventually known or unknown to the employee. Public
policy, it was held, invalidated such a blanket agreement. Such public
policy was applied in holding that the labor statutes affording special
protection eliminated the defense of assumption of risk. Apart therefrom
the basic rights and obligations between employer and employee as
existent under common law are not otherwise altered. Extension of the
rule to situations coming solely under the provisions of the common law
must be regarded as gratuitous and as contrary to the well accepted concepts governing the relationship between master and servant where not
affected by special labor statutes. At any rate the rule which in such a
short period came into being to upset a large body of precedent was
clearly restated and affirmed in Christiensen v. Morse Drydock and
Repair Company." There, in a suit upon violation of the Labor Law
relating to scaffolds, the defendant requested the Trial Court to charge
that breach of an express provision of the Labor Law does not take away
the defense of assumption of risk. The request was denied. The Appellate
Court regarded as conceded, on the authority of the Fitzwater case, that
assumption of risk was not a defense to an action based on the employer's
violation of a statute imposing a "specific duty in express terms".
While the rather casual manner of the recent Fiore case49 fails to
recognize the change from the early rule, now well established, the issue
seemed to have been definitely determined in New York State. 0 In
Michalek v. U. S. Gypsum Co.," Judge Rippey (now a member of the
New York Court of Appeals) held the defense of assumption of risk to
be insufficient, thus recognizing the doctrine of the Fitzwater case as
the substantive rule of this State. It is nevertheless true that the issue
has been passed upon in various other states with diverse results 2
48. 179 App. Div. 825, 167 N. Y. Supp. 57 (2d Dep't 1917).
49. Fiore et al. v. General Railway Signal Company, 249 App. Div. 708, 292 N. Y.
Supp. 704 (4th Dep't 1936).
50. The Court of Appeals on various occasions recognized the new holding, Dougherty
v. Pratt Institute, 244 N. Y. 111, 155 N. E. 67 (1926); Encarnacion v. Jamison et al., 251
N. Y. 218, 167 N. E. 422 (1929).
51. 16 Fed. Supp. 708 (D. C. N. Y. 1936); Pieczonka v. Pullman Co., 89 F. (2d) 353,
is to be distinguished as not involving a labor law cause of action.
52. The conflict in decisions of the various states had been early recognized by LABATT,
In Vol. 5, at p. 5060, discussing the relative merits
MASTER AND SERVANT (2nd ed. 1913).
of the rules, he stated: "The more rational view would seem to be that to permit a servant
to assume such a risk would have the practical result of nullifying the beneficial effect
of the statute, for it would be possible for the master merely to notify the servant of his
failure to perform the statutory duty-in order to avoid any liability to the servant for such
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There have been some untoward and extreme results. One has been
the extension, referred to above, of the rule to cases not in reality founded
upon Labor Law violations. Another has been the holding that contributory negligence is not available as a defense to a Labor Law cause
of action. The Appellate Division of the First Department so held in
Stern v. Great Island Corporation." The logic of the holding is only
technically sound. The Court said, in striking the defense of contributory
negligence from the answer:
"Since the plaintiff's cause of action rests on negligence, contributory
negligence does not constitute a defense. Indeed, the very purpose of
the statute was to protect plaintiff's intestate and others in like position
from the consequences of their own negligence. It would be strange,
therefore, if the same negligence could defeat the. operation of the
statute.""4
The Labor Law cause of action, it is quite true, does not depend on
negligence. So with relation to its violation one could not in a strict
sense be contributorily negligent. However, such public policy as manifestly is repugnant to an employee's assumption of risk certainly has no
application to the instance of an employee who by his own act increases
the existent risk. Whether such act of the employee is in a fine sense
contributory "negligence", seems of little consequence. Only the intent
to inflict a penalty or a complete reliance upon a rigid concept would
explain, but not justify, the failure to preserve as a defense the contributory act of the employee which unduly increases the risk. So to
hold is in any event to disregard the basic and practical distinction between assumption of risk and contributory negligence,5 5 clear beyond
56
question at least since Thomas v. Quartermaine.
With the increased advantage thus to be gained by a suit upon a Labor
Law cause of action naturally the precise nature of such an action has
been brought into sharper focus. The most troublesome question which
failure."
In a suit upon a statute almost identical with New York's, the Pennsylvania Court, in
Plazak v. Allegheny Steel Co., 324 Pa. 422, 188 At. 130 (1936), wherein the plaintiff had
contracted silicosis, held that "by continuing in the employment, plaintiff did not assume
the risk."
53. 250 App. Div. 115, 293 N. Y. Supp. 608 (1st Dep't 1937). In Friedman v. Beck,
250 App. Div. 87, 293 N. Y. Supp. 649 (1st Dep't 1937), appeal dismissed, 274 N. Y. 566,
10 N. E. (2d) 554, the elusiveness of the problem is again demonstrated in connection with
another type of statute.
54. Id. at 116.
55. See note 27, supra, as to Bohlen's comments on this distinction as applied.
56. 18 Q. B. 685 (1887).
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has arisen lies in the significance to be given to the rules of the Industrial
Board of the Department of Labor. The formulation of such rules to
supplement the Labor Law is expressly provided for by that Act. It
has been held that these rules, made pursuant to statute, under a strict
construction of the constitutionality of the delegation of powers, form
no part of a Labor Law cause of action. That view is subject to much
doubt and the question cannot be regarded as settled. s
To speculate upon the motivation of the courts in arriving at any
particular decision or in reversing themselves is perhaps no less idle than
to seek the intent of the Legislature in connection with a statute. Nevertheless, it is notable that the Court which decided the Gombert case in
February, 1911, rendered the decision in Ives v. South Buffalo Ry. Co. 9
the following month holding unconstitutional the first Workmen's Compensation Act. The Court composed of the identical members the following year rendered the decision in the Fitzwater case. We know that at
the time the Fitzwater case was decided, there was pending the constitutional amendment designed to render valid a Workmen's Compensation
Act replacing the act of 1910 held unconstitutional. Whether this back57. N. Y. LABOR LAW, §§ 27, 27-a, 299 and others. The power to make such rules has
been successively shifted from the Industrial Commission to the Industrial Board, and now
for the most part would seem to rest with the Board of Standards and Appeals.
58. In Schumer v. Caplin, 241 N. Y. 346, 150 N. E. 139 (1925) judgment for the plaintiff was reversed upon the basis of error in the charge that violation of a rule of the
Industrial Commission constituted negligence per se. This view was undisturbed until the
dictum of judge Lehman writing for the Court of Appeals in Schmidt v. Merchants
Despatch Transportation Co., 270 N. Y. 287, 200 N. E. 824 (1936), wherein after analysis
of a Labor Law cause of action it was additionally stated at page 306, 200 N. E. at 830:
"It imposes an absolute duty upon employers to provide adequate and proper safeguards.
In the performance of that duty there may be some room for discretion as to what safeguards may be proper and adequate. There are perhaps some gaps to be filled in by
administrative regulations." (Italics added). Some intimation to the contrary may possibly
be inferred from the language in Teller v. Prospect Heights Hospital, 280 N. Y. 456, 21
N. E. (2d) 504 (1939). The Appellate Division of the Fourth Department in Moccia v.
Pfaudler, 251 App. Div. 796, 296 N. Y. Supp. 711 (1937) has taken the position in this
connection that on the authority of Schumer v. Caplin, supra, "a breach of a rule is but
evidence of negligence which has no place in the action for breach of the statutory obligation." Upon the problem of the availability of assumption of risk, it is very questionable
that such a rule could prevail in light of the intensive integration of the statute and rules.
59. 201 N. Y. 271, 94 N. E. 431 (1911). One of the issues which the Court considered
was that of the effect of the proposed compensation act upon the defense of assumption
of risk. In that connection the principal opinion, rendered a month after the Gombert
case, observed that, contrary to the rule at common law, under the Labor Law and
Employers' Liability Act the employee is presumed to have assented only to those risks
of employment present alter exercise by the employer of due care and after compliance by
the employer with the applicable labor statute.
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ground influenced the Court to decide the Fitzwater case without so
much as mentioning the previous Gombert case is of course problematical
but also probable.
At the time the Appellate Division of the Fourth Department rendered
the decision in the Fiore case, there were pending literally hundreds of
cases or claims in the western area of the State founded upon alleged
Labor Law violations in connection with industrial operation. These
claims seemed to threaten in a rather serious way certain phases of manufacturing operations in such industrial centers as Syracuse, Rochester,
Buffalo, and Niagara Falls.
Whatever explanation may be offered for the seeming reaction in rule
demonstrated in the Fiore case, there can be no doubt of the soundness
of the opposing rule more recently declared by the Third Department
in the Griebsch case.60 The protective and beneficient intent behind the
labor statutes is supported by a public policy too forceful and well established to be whittled away at this late time.
60. Griebsch v. B. T. Babbitt, Inc., 254 App. Div. 601, 2 N. Y. S. (2d) 848 (3d Dep't
1938), aff'g 164 Misc. 7, 298 N. Y. Supp. 848 (1937).
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